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Public policy has been focused on controlling the conflicts of interests in
banks for the last eighty-five years with limited success. Banks have a unique
place in the economy as intermediaries between investors and companies,
allowing them to obtain signficant private, proprietary information. Public
policy is focused on trying to ensure that banks do not misuse this information
for their own benefit to the detriment of their clients. This is a tough task.
In this Article, we focus our attention more specifically on proprietary
trading. We exploit a unique dataset hat allows us to observe the information
banks receive and what they do with it. When banks are hired as investment
advisers, they become temporary insiders, and they are required to report all
transactions in their client firms 'stock to the SEC. Using this unique dataset, we
analyze the kind of information banks acquire about their clients as part of their
financial intermediary and advisory roles. Our data show that this information
is highly valuable to banks. Specifically, banks have been able to earn more than
25% returns above market from proprietary trades on this information.
Furthermore, after Glass-Steagall's prohibitions against commercial banks
engaging in investment banking activities were relaxed, this return on investment
rose to a whopping 40%.
The Volcker Rule was enacted to aid in reducing systemic risks in the
banking system and, among other purposes, to eliminate conflicts of interest hat
arise when banks profit at the expense of their clients. Scholars have previously
argued that the Volcker Rule should be vigorously enforced to eliminate
temptations to trade on material non-public information for banks' benefit and
against their client's interest. We provide important empirical research for this
proposition by showing that banks indeed trade on non-public information and
earn higher than expected returns.
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Introduction
In the banking sector, severe conflicts of interest can arise when, in the
process of fulfilling their financial intermediary and adviser roles, bank
executives become aware of opportunities to enter transactions for their own
benefit that may also be detrimental to their banking clients. Examples of
banking conflicts include the marketing and sale of banking products such as
new securities and bank loans created with knowledge of material, non-public
adverse information about their client firms. Conflicts involving banks are also
344
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evident in foreign exchange' and LIBOR manipulation,2 the Enron' and Madoff'
scandals, and banks' huge trading losses such as the London Whale trade.'
The original motivation for the Glass-Steagall Act, which restricted banks
from underwriting new securities, was in part to control these potential conflicts.
Specifically, it aimed to prevent banks from using the material, non-public,
adverse information they acquire from normal banking activities in underwriting
new securities. If banks realized that a particular client is in danger of financial
distress, they would have an incentive to arrange for a new security sale to the
public and use the proceeds of those sales to pay off the bank loans.6
The gradual weakening and subsequent repeal of most provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 allowed commercial banks to acquire investment
banking subsidiaries, grow substantially in size, and access even more
information through more diverse banking activities.7 At the same time,
proprietary trading became a major source of revenue for the banks.
8
1. Large, international banks in different parts ofthe world colluded for at least a decade
to rig exchange rates by front-running client orders and rigging the foreign exchange benchmark to gain
financial benefits. See Philip Augar, How the Forex Scandal Happened, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30003693 [http://perma.cc/T9WZ-J3XE]; Matt Levine, Banks
Manipulate Foreign Exchange in Ways You Can't Teach, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:15 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-11-12/banks-manipulated-foreign-exchange-in-ways-
you-can-t-teach [http://perma.cc/8LZ9-JWHX].
2. The Wall Street Journal ran a story in April 2008 claiming that some banks
understated their borrowing costs. Two years later, collusion was confirmed among the banks for the
purpose of having LIBOR-related portfolios and making financial gains from these portfolios. See Carrick
Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate amid Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120831164167818299.html [http://perma.cc/PXZ3-573K].
3. Top management of Enron overstated financial performance by repackaging bank
loans to appear as Enron's profits. Enron's bankruptcy swept away billions of dollars from investors'
pockets and forced Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). See Enron Fast Facts, CNN (Apr.
23, 2018, 11:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-facts/index.html [http://perma.cc
/KCQ2-KF4Q]; The Fall of Enron, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 17, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2001-12-16/the-fall-of-enron [http://perma.cc/8BLU-6MJR].
4. Banks enabled Bernie Madoff to create and perpetuate a Ponzi scheme that lasted for
several years. See Stephanie Yang, 5 Years Ago Bernie Madoff Was Sentenced to 150 Years in Prison -
Here's How His Scheme Worked, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 1, 2014, 6:54 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/how-bernie-madoffs-ponzi-scheme-worked-2014-7 [http://perma.cc/BA2A-G276].
5. Even though it was not a fraud, this incident is an example of bad risk management
and its consequences on financial markets and investors. See Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale,
BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-london-
whale [http://perma.cc/3L63-8KB9].
6. See Brett McDonnell, Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and
After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 9 (2011) (noting that "distressed consumers and
businesses default[ing] on loans, worsen[s] bank balance sheets").
7. See Heather Long, What the Heck is the Controversial Glass-Steagall Act?, CNN
MONEY (Oct. 14, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/14/investing/democratic-debate-what-
is-glass-steagall-act/index.html [http://perma.cc/AWS4-886E] (discussing how the repeal in 1999 allowed
banks to grow bigger); Julia Maues, Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass-steagall-act [http://perma.cc/459P-
N4E4].
8. See, e.g., Imogen Rose-Smith, The End of Proprietary Trading May Hit Banks'
Profits But Help Their Stock Prices, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.
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The subsequent financial crisis of 2008 exposed another glaring weakness
of banking in the post-Glass-Steagall era. Banks had grown too big, too risky,
and too interconnected, with many surpassing trillions of dollars in assets,
interbank loans, and liabilities on and off the balance sheet. The sheer size, risk,
and interconnectedness of banking raised concerns about systemically important
and too-big-to-fail banks. After numerous attempts to bring back Glass-Steagall
failed, Congress attempted to contain systemic banking risk by passing the
Volcker Rule, which prohibited proprietary trading, and enacting, through the
Dodd-Frank Act, consumer protection and other ring-fencing and fire-wall
provisions.9 The stated purpose of the Volcker Rule is as follows:
(1) to reduce risks to the financial system by limiting the ability of banks to engage
in activities other than socially valuable core banking activities;
(2) to protect taxpayers and reduce moral hazard by removing explicit and implicit
government guarantees for high-risk activities outside of the core business of
banking; and (3) to eliminate any conflict of interest that arises from banks
engaging in activities from which their profits are earned at the expense of their
customers or clients.10
To test the potential importance of the Volcker Rule, we would need to
focus on proprietary trading, and we would need to know the amount of profits
banks make from using proprietary adverse information about their clients.
However, the source of the proprietary information banks use to execute their
proprietary trading programs is typically confidential. Furthermore, banks do not
disclose where and how they obtain this confidential information, which helps
them create billions of dollars of profits every year.
In this Article, we investigate one possible source of this information.
Specifically, we investigate the importance of the private information banks
acquire as part of their financial intermediary and financial advisory role for their
client firms. Banks often attain insider trading status and become subject to
insider trading reporting requirements and trading restrictions when they are
hired to provide financial advice to their client firms. When banks become
temporary insiders, they must also report all these trades executed on Forms 3,
4, and 5 alongside other legal insiders.11
Using this insider trading database, we demonstrate that banks and other
investment advisers can and do access important, private, material information
institutionalinvestor.com/Article/2741999/Markets-Regulation/The-End-of-Proprietary-Trading-May-
Hit-Banks-Profits-But-Help-Their-Stock-Prices.html#.WVPm-YTytaQ [http://perma.cc/7T42-FXCB]
(discussing the massive earnings the Goldman Sachs Group obtained through proprietary trading, noting
that "the firm has demonstrated an uncanny ability to generate huge profits trading its own capital in
everything from stocks and bonds to commodities, currencies and derivatives").
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
10. 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2017, H.R. 2585, 115th Cong. (2017).




Eliminating Conflicts of Interest in Banks
about their clients and appear to trade on this information. On average, the inside
information that banks and investment advisers acquire and trade on is highly
valuable, allowing them to earn more on 25% on their proprietary trades.
Furthermore, we find that relaxation and elimination of the Glass-Steagall
restrictions allowed the banks and investment advisers to trade more frequently
and earn a greater amount of abnormal profits. Since 2002, banks and other
investment advisers appeared to have earned more than 40% abnormal profits
from adverse information about their client firms. While previous scholars have
argued that an added benefit of enforcing the Volcker Rule would be to eliminate
the incentives to trade on material, non-public information about their clients by
eliminating proprietary trading by banks,12 this Article provides important
empirical support for this claim. In other words, our data supports the idea in the
literature that enforcing the Volcker Rule would also help contain some of the
current conflicts of interest in the banking system resulting from the elimination
of Glass-Steagall restrictions.
What distinguishes our empirical analysis from previous studies is that our
analysis is broader in scope and different in focus. For example, previous studies
have focused on particular remedies,13 or on a different source of conflicts of
interest.14 Our study examines illicit behavior connected to proprietary trading
and illustrates that it is a widespread problem that could be solved by rigorous
application of the Volcker rule.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I presents a brief history of the
Glass-Steagall Act, including a discussion of its subsequent erosion. In Part II,
we discuss the conflicts of interest presented by proprietary trading and analyze
current mechanisms addressing conflicts, focusing in particular on Chinese
Walls and the Volcker Rule. We then present our empirical analysis in Part III
which provides evidence that conflicts of interest are alive and well. That is, the
temptation for banks is too great, and they indeed trade on the confidential, inside
information obtained from their clients. This Part thus highlights the need for
regulation to decrease the conflicts of interest inherent in proprietary trading
through strong enforcement of the Volcker Rule. Recommendations and
concluding remarks follow.
I. The Glass-Steagall Legislation: A Brief History
In order to illustrate why rigorous enforcement of the Volcker rule is
necessary to reduce the harms caused by conflicts of interest and proprietary
12. See infra note 108.
13. See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls
in Securities Firms, 4 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 369, 386 (2008) (examining the effectiveness of "Chinese
Walls" to combat conflicts of interest).
14. See, e.g., id. at 370 n.3 (discussing previous studies looking at conflicts of interest
between bonds and analysts).
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trading, context is important. This Part gives context to the key historical and
policy developments that led to the enactment of the Volcker Rule.
Buttressed by skyrocketing unemployment, plummeting stock valuations,
evidence of securities manipulation and outright fraud, the Great Depression
served as the motivating force for the foundational legislation of the securities,
finance, and banking industries. Acts such as the Securities Act of 193315 and
the Exchange Act of 193416 have become the cornerstones of the world-leading
U.S. financial system. One such cornerstone act, known as the Glass-Steagall
Act," has been gradually torn down by market forces, even though the problems
it aimed to remedy still exist today.
Before the Glass-Steagall egislation and the accompanying financial and
securities reforms, there was little federal regulation of the banking industry.8
The Office of Comptroller of the Currency was not created until 1864 and then
only had authority over national banks, which many were not.19 Market forces
kept commercial banks from expanding into investment banking.2 0 Savings and
loan (S&L) institutions largely focused on long-term securities and mortgages as
well as taking small deposit amounts.2 1 After the Civil War, the U.S. banking
system extended a divide between commercial and investment banking.2 2
Then came the Great Depression. Following the stock market crash in 1929
and through 1933, U.S. GDP fell by 30%, unemployment soared to 25%, the
stock market dropped 80%, and over 7,000 banks failed.23 Bank depositors lost
almost $400 million, the equivalent of over $5.6 billion in 2017 dollars.24
The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited commercial banks from engaging in
either investment banking or nonbanking activities in an effort to both limit
unsafe speculation by banks with consumers' funds as well as prevent self-
15. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title 1, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018)).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2018)).
17. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
18. James R. Barth et al., Bank Regulation in the United States, 56 CESIFo ECON. STUD.
112, 114-19 (2010).
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Michelle Clark Neely, Commercial & Investment Banking: Should this Divorce be
Saved?, REGIONAL ECONOMIST (1995), http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-
1995/commercial--investment-banking-should-this-divorce-be-saved [http://perma.cc/U2XF-EYZD].
23. David C. Wheelock, The Great Depression: An Overview, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LOUIS xi, http://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/Great-Depression/the-great-depression-
wheelock-overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/WZN6-MND5].
24. See James Lardner, A Brief History of the Glass-Steagall Act, DEMOS 1 (Nov. 10,
2009), http://www.demos.org/publication/brief-history-glass-steagall-act [h tp://perma.cc/8NBT-ATUU]
(assuming the annual inflation rate was 3.05% from 1929 to 2017).
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dealing and conflicts of interest.25 Commercial banks could not affiliate with
investment banks.2 6 Regarding securities, "[t]he Glass-Steagall Act accordingly
gave banks a year to decide: they could get out of the securities business, and
enjoy the benefits of deposit insurance and access to the low-interest credit of
the Federal Reserve; or they could be investment banks and brokerage houses,
[and] forego those privileges."27
The gradual weakening and subsequent partial repeal of Glass-Steagall in
1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act28 allowed commercial banks to merge
with investment banks, enabling these financial conglomerates to grow in size
substantially. Further, investment activities grew in importance to commercial
banks. Such increased importance bred conflicts of interest; to prevent these
conflicts from negatively affecting consumers, the SEC mandated the creation
of so-called "Chinese Walls" within the firms, which refers to complete
separation of personnel, decision-making, and compensation between conflicted
departments.
The subsequent financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the shortcomings of
these Chinese Walls. Although somewhat effective, they did not adequately
replace Glass-Steagall's now-removed conflict of interest protections. In 2010,
after numerous attempts to reinstate Glass-Steagall failed, Congress attempted
to remedy the conflicts of interest inherent in universal banking by passing the
Volcker Rule, as well as enacting other consumer protections and ring-fencing
and fire-wall provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.29
The next section begins with a brief overview of the history of the Glass-
Steagall legislation, followed by the relevant provisions of the statute relating to
banking conflicts of interest. It continues with a discussion of the forces leading
to the gradual demise of Glass-Steagall, concluding with an overview of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
A. Legislative History: The Pecora Commission
Appointed as chief counsel to the U.S. Senate's Committee on Banking and
Currency, New York District Attorney Ferdinand Pecora led a media-frenzied




28. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered-sections of 15 U.S.C.).
29. See Christoph Kumpan & Patrick C. Leyens, Conflicts of Interest of Financial
Intermediaries: Towards a Global Common Core in Conflicts ofInterest Regulation, 5 EUR. CORP. FIN.
L. REv. 72, 74 (2008) (noting that financial intermediaries "serve as a device for securing capital market
stability").
30. Bill Moyer, Bill Moyer's Journal Transcript Part II, PBS (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/joumal/04242009/transcriptl.html [http://perma.cc/EW2Z-HTV8].
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Great Depression and alongside the infamous mandatory four-day banking
holiday, uncovered actions of the bankers that built on existing public outrage.
A Chase National Bank executive had shorted his company's stock, and National
City Bank packaged failed loans as securities and sold them off to unknowing
investors.3 1 Charles Mitchell sold discounted stocks to a family member to avoid
paying taxes.32 The J.P. Morgan Bank maintained a "preferred list" of powerful
businessmen to whom it would provide favors and offer securities at below
market prices. Jack Morgan paid no income tax in 1921, 1922, or 1923.34 The
populist outrage stirred up by the Pecora Commission compelled Congress and
the President to action and resulted in the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act.
35
B. Glass-Steagall
The statute states three purposes:
1) To provide for safer and more effective use of bank assets;
2) To limit stock market speculation; and
3) To prevent self-dealing and conflicts of interest.
As the Court elaborated in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, Congress was
concerned with the "promotional interest of the investment banker and the
obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested investment
advice."37 The interests of the commercial and investment banker could often be
in conflict. The commercial banker was entrusted with government insured funds
while the investment banker often looked to sell securities, which could be
purchased with those funds.
31. Lardner, supra note 24.
32. Subcommittee on Senate Resolutions 84 and 234 (The Pecora Committee), U.S.
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/commonlinvestigations/Pecora.htn [http://perma
.cc/5R3S-EPL9]. In almost poetic fashion, Charles "Sunshine" Mitchell, who entered the Pecora hearings
surrounded by throngs of attorneys and support staff, exited ten days later abandoned and alone. He
resigned shortly thereafter. Michael A. Perino, Ferdinand Pecora: The Hellhound of Wall Street, 21
EXPERIENCE 15, 18-19 (2011).
33. Bonnie James, It's Past Time for a New Pecora Commission, 39 EXECUTIVE
INTELLIGENCE REV. 12, 12 (2012). This preferred list contained multiple presidents, treasury secretaries,
and chairman of both the Democratic and Republican national committees and many other politicians.
See Alexander Tabarrok, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Morgans vs. The
Rockefellers, 1 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 1, 3 (1998).
34, See James, supra note 33, at 15. Chase National Bank voluntarily separated their
investment and commercial banking practices in early 1933, likely easing industry pushback to Glass-
Steagall. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy and Productivity: The Glass-Steagall Act and the
Shifing Discourse ofFinancial Regulation, 24 J. POL'Y HIST. 612,618 (2012).
35. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
36. Id.
37. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 663 (1971).
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Glass-Steagall is found in Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the much broader
Banking Act of 1933. Coming in as a part of FDR's New Deal and alongside
the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange Act, the Banking Act of 1933
also established federal deposit insurance, increased Federal Reserve oversight
over national banks, created the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), and
introduced Regulation Q's predecessor, which outlawed the payment of interest
rates on checking accounts and gave the Federal Reserve the power to set caps
on interest paid on other deposits.3 9
1. Section 16
Section 16 limits national commercial banks to exercising "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."40 It
also outlaws underwriting and limits dealing in investment securities to non-
recourse brokerage activities on behalf of clients.4 1 However, these prohibitions
were never an impenetrable firewall that completely separated investment and
commercial banking. Section 16 granted the OCC the power to allow banks to
trade up to 15% of their capital stock and 25% of their surplus funds for their
own account, up to the lesser of 10% or $100,000 in any one security.42 Section
16 also contained a carve-out for "bank-eligible securities," at the time
obligations of the United States, the States or any political subdivision of either.43
2. Section 20
Section 20 prohibited commercial, member bank affiliates from
"engag[ing] principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution ... securities."44 Violations resulted in ongoing fines and eventual
discontinuation of privileges granted to banks through the Federal Reserve
System.45
38. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32; DAvID H. CARPENTERET AL., CONG. RES.
SERV., R.44349, THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT: A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS 13 (2016).
39. Julia Maues, Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22,
2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25 [http://perma.cc/RP5T-Q3RV].
Although Glass was the driving force behind Glass-Steagall, the then chairman of the House Banking and
Currency Committee, Henry Steagall, agreed to sponsor the bill if the creation of deposit insurance was
included. Id. Glass was opposed to the creation of deposit insurance. Michael Perino, What FDR Hated
About Glass-Steagall, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 14, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles
/2013-06-14/what-fdr-hated-about-glass-steagall [http://perma.cc/5Y23-ZAKMj.
40. Banking Act of 1933 § 16.
41. Id.
42. Id. Banks were given one year to come into compliance with Glass-Steagall. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 20. Sections 20's "principally engaged" language left enough ambiguity that
banks occasionally acquired affiliates engaged in some prohibited activities, but not enough to make the
acquisitions prohibited. By 2000 there were fifty-one of these "Section 20 Affiliates."
45. Id.
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3. Section 21
As the inverse to Section 20, Section 21 made it illegal for investment banks
to engage in deposit taking.46 Qualifying deposits were only demand deposits;
those "subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the
depositor.47
4. Section 32
Section 32 banned officers and directors of commercial, Federal Reserve
member banks from being an officer, director or manager of an "organization
engaged primarily in the securities business .... " 4 8 It also largely disallowed
member banks from dealing with non-member banks that would be in violation
of this section if they were a member without prior Federal Reserve permission.
C. The Gradual Erosion of Glass-Steagall
Glass-Steagall's divide began to erode almost immediately after its
enactment. Competitive forces between investment, commercial, and
international banks, as well as regulatory arbitrage and turf battles, caused
regulators and the Judiciary to alter the Act without evidence that the underlying
problems motivating the Act had dissipated; these actions were taken without
(and sometimes against) evidence of legislative intent.49
46. Id, § 21.
47. Id. Section 30 also contained a prohibition on any entity or person from taking
demand deposits unless subject to Federal Reserve or Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
oversight. See id. § 30.
48. Id. § 32. Although the intent was not to break up "too-big-to-fail" banks, it had that
immediate effect. JP Morgan spun off Morgan Stanley as a stand-alone investment banking entity shortly
after its passage. CARPENTERET AL., supra note 38, at 8.
49. There seemed to be a number of misconceptions around the Glass-Steagall Act. For
example, consider the following: Critics claimed that it was wrong to assume that a bank's securities
activities had much to do with insolvencies in the 1930s, but different provisions ofthe Banking Act were
meant to prevent future insolvencies. Don More, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An Argument Against
Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 433, 440-41 (1991). The Glass-Steagall Act, on the other
hand, was enacted "specifically to protect the securities markets from the destabilizing effect of
commercial banks, rather than the other way around." Id. at 442. Thus:
The key causation question therefore is not whether the banking industry's
problems in the 1930s were caused by commercial bank involvement in securities
activities, but whether securities speculation was encouraged by such involvement.
As to. the latter question, it is beyond doubt that commercial banks' heavy
diversion of depositors' funds into securities was the major factor behind the
disastrous run-up in the stock market.
Id. at 443.
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1. Immediate Loopholes
Because Glass-Steagall put no legal restrictions on activities conducted by
entities that owned commercial banks, bank holding companies (BHCs) were
immediately utilized as a loophole to the Act's restrictions.50 By incorporating
under a BHC, banks could enjoy much of the benefits of being an investment
bank without running afoul of Glass Steagall while also creating the relationships
and conflicts the Act aimed to remedy.5 1 By 1938, numerous Senators (including
Senator Glass) and President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for further regulation
or prohibition of BHCs.52 This regulation did not come about until the 1956 Bank
Holding Company Act, which, among other things, limited the nonbanking
companies a BHC could own to those "so closely related to the business of
banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto
. .. "5 But the 1956 Act did not eliminate the loophole completely. It was not
until the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act that this loophole
was finally closed.5 4
2. Market Competition
Outside competitors encroaching on commercial banking activities often
led to the loosening of Glass-Steagall based regulations. As lightly regulated
nonbanks competed with banks, their unequal treatment often seemed
unjustified. In response, the stricter regulator often loosened its policies to stem
the exit of constituent entities to the more lucrative form despite no evidence or
legislative signal that the risks the Act was originally aimed at mitigating no
longer existed.
In response to increasing interest rates and asset/liability maturity mismatch
in the savings and loan (S&L) industry, in 1982, after 118 S&L institutions failed
and 752 merged, 418 S&L institutions with assets of $220 billion were still
50. Saule T. Omarova & Tahyar E. Margaret, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting
the History ofBank Holding Company Regulations in the United States, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 113,
121 (2012).
51. See id. ("The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited banks from participating
in the securities dealing and underwriting business and from affiliating with securities firms, otherwise
did not impose any specific legal restrictions on the activities of business entities that owned or controlled
commercial banks.").
52. Glass Moves to End Bank Holding Firms, CHI. DAILY TRIB. (Jan. 25, 1938),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1938/01/25/page/2 1 article/glass-moves-to-end-bank-holding-firms
[http://perma.cc/WD6F-ZPFB]. The Federal Reserve had spoken out against bank holding companies as
early as 1927. Omarova & Margaret, supra note 50, at 132-33.
53. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133,
137 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (2018)).
54. See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 50, at 146. In Congressional hearings leading
up to the amendment, the Federal Reserve Board noted that "there [was] less need for concern of
preferential treatment in extending credit where no commercial loans [were] involved." Id. at 137.
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insolvent.55 This insolvency, combined with subsequent government bailouts,
led regulators to revise the S&L regulatory regime and loosen their restraint on
the sector. In turn, these actions increased competition between S&L institutions
and banks.56 In July of 1982, S&Ls were allowed to amortize goodwill in
mergers over forty years, instead of the ten years allowed previously, taking the
regulators off the hook for what would be otherwise insolvent banks and grossly
overstating the actual value of otherwise insolvent institutions.
S&Ls grew rapidly after these changes,5 8  which affected the
competitiveness and profitability of banks in a multitude of ways. Both sectors
directly competed for depositors' funds, increasing their costs of capital which
S&Ls needed less.5 9 Inexperienced and unskilled S&L institutions, flush with
cash and unrestricted in their practices, also competed with commercial banks in
issuing loans.60
Competitive pressures from abroad, most notably Europe, Japan, and
Canada, played a role in gradually spurring the expansion of banking powers.61
These foreign institutions could often operate more broadly in the U.S. than
domestic banks, putting the domestic banks at a competitive disadvantage.62
3. Regulatory Changes
Regulatory turf battles, driven by both domestic and international
competitive marketplace forces and political dealings among, for the most part,
(1) the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) as the regulator of bank holding companies
and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System,63 (2) Office of
55. The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking, in 1 HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 168-69 (1997). The ordeal is sometimes referred to as the "S&L
Debacle." Id.
56. Id. at 184.
57. Fed. Res. Bank of S.F., FRBSF Weekly Letter: S&L Accounting, FED. RES. BANK
ST. LOUIS 2 (Dec. 21, 1984), http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/frbsf/frbsf let/frbsflet
19841221.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4YE-EZG8]. Relaxation of investor control limits also were lifted in an
effort to attract new capital to the industry. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., infra note 71, at 175.
58. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., infra note 71, at 178.
59. See id. at 181 (noting that "accounting distortions favored high-growth S&Ls that
continued to report healthy returns on assets and regulatory net worth.. . . [and] the bidding up of deposit
interest rates by aggressive and/or insolvent S&Ls increased the cost of funds, [was] adversely affecting
both commercial banks and conservatively run thrifts").
60. See id. ("[B]anks were negatively influenced by the entrance of inexperienced and,
in some cases, rogue S&Ls into commercial and real estate lending.").
61. See WILLIAM D. JACKSON, CONG. RES. SERV., 1B87061, GLASS-STEAGALL ACT:
COMMERCIAL VS. INVESTMENT BANKING (1987) (discussing the impact foreign banks had on financial
reforms within the U.S.).
62. Id.
63. MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., R43087, WHO
REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 23 (2009). The Dodd-Frank Act
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Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) as the regulator of national banks, (3) U.S.
federal branches of foreign banks and federally chartered thrift institutions,6 4 and
(4) the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates brokers,
dealers, clearing agencies, mutual funds and investment advisers6 5 greatly
contributed to the erosion of the Glass-Steagall commercial-investment bank
barrier.
In 1937, the FRB revised Regulation F, which provided rules for bank-run
common-trust funds, which are pooled funds of small trusts held and
administered by a bank and exempt from the reporting requirements of the
otherwise applicable Investment Company Act of 1940.66 The SEC originally
refrained from combatting this expansion because the FRB prevented common-
trust funds from being used solely as a device for collective investment.6 7 After
a 1962 statutory shift in power, the OCC amended Regulation F with Regulation
9, eliminating this FRB limitation. The SEC finally pushed back on this
infringement of their regulatory territory.68 In Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,
the Supreme Court ruled that this expansion of power was outlawed by Glass-
Steagall when it was used to both pool and manage trust funds.6 9 Banks could
manage clients' funds and pool clients' funds, but not in conjunction with each
other.70
In the 1970s and 1980s, the regulators' language marked a shift away from
maintaining the Glass-Steagall wall to a debate over the proper regulatory
regime. In 1972, the FRB amended Regulation Y to include "serving as
investment adviser ... to an investment company . .. so closely related to
banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto" and therefore be deemed a
permissible BHC affiliate activity.7 1 In 1957, the OCC allowed banks to profit
from brokerage transactions provided on behalf of their existing customers
only.72 However, the OCC expanded this interpretation in 1982 to allow national
banks to offer discount brokerage services to both customers and non-
customers.73 In 1983, the FRB enlarged its regulatory reach by including retail
64. Id.
65. Id. at 15-16.
66. Comment, Regulation ofBank-Operated Collective Investment Funds-Judicial or
Legislative Resolution ofan Administrative Controversy?, 73 YALE L.J. 1249, 1250-51 (1964).
67. Id. at 1251.
68. Id. at 1251-52.
69. 401 U.S. 617.
70. Id. at 624-25.
71. FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts: 7500 - FRB Regulations, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/7500-3900.html [http://perma.cc/2LCL-7W9M].
72. Philip Wallach, Policy Erosion and Policy Maintenance: The Case of Glass-Steagall
(Nov. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://lapa.princeton.edu/sites/default/filesfWallachLEGS
Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/MW38-UZ78].
73. Intuit Inc. Elec. Fin. Servs. Council, Promoting Efficient Arrangements Between
Portals and Online Brokers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 6 (June 2000), http://www.sec.gov
/pdf/intuitefsepaper.pdf [http://perma.ccrr2F9-ER9L].
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securities brokerages, engaged solely in buying and selling of securities on
behalf of clients without giving investment advice as "so closely related to
banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto."74 In what some saw as an apparent
conflict with the legislative text, the FRB ruled in 1986 that a commercial bank
could derive up to 5% of its gross revenues from investment banking. In 1996,
this limit was raised to 25%, virtually rendering Glass-Steagall's wall moot.76
4. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
The erosion of what was left of Glass-Steagall's divide picked up speed in
the 1990s. By 1999, 70% of banks offered insurance products.77 In 1998,
Citigroup Bank and Travelers Insurance proposed what at the time was the
largest corporate merger; creating the largest financial institution ever, in blatant
violation of Glass-Steagall.7 8 No regulator staged complete resistance to the
merger. They only threatened requiring possible divestitures. After these threats,
Citi and Travelers joined an already existing movement and strongly lobbied for
a repeal of Glass-Steagall.79 It came about in the Financial Modernization Act of
1999, commonly known as the GLBA.s0
The GLBA, signed into law by President Bill Clinton, was enacted with the
intention of promoting the benefits of financial integration while still
safeguarding the soundness of the financial system. This final part was an
acknowledgement of the continuing risks Glass-Steagall aimed to remedy.8 1 The
74. Sec.,Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207,210,215
(1984) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)).
75. Matthew Sherman, A Short History ofFinancial Deregulation in the United States,
CTR. ECON. & POL'Y RES., at 9 (July 2009), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-
07.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ALM-E24H].
76. Id.
77. Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis: A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-
Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach Bliley, 12 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1102 (2010). Alan Greenspan, then
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, openly championed the demise of Glass-Steagall because he believed
the law would negatively affect the United States' position in the financial world. His views did recognize
that the conflicts of interest Glass-Steagall aimed to remove still existed, though. He believed a bank's
banking and securities activities needed to be kept at arms-length in any future legislation. Hugh Vickery,
Greenspan Warns Congress of Glass-Steagall, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Nov. 18, 1987),
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1 987/11/18/Greenspan-wams-Congress-of-Glass-Steagall
/1253564210000/ [http://perma.cc/Q97L-5EQ5].
78. Lardner, supra note 24, at 2.
79. Id.
80. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Lardner, supra note 24, at 2. Citi and Travelers merged
shortly after GLBA but separated when Travelers was spun off in 2002. Keisha Lamothe, Travelers Buys
Back Its Red Umbrella, CNN MONEY (Feb. 13, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/13/news
/companies/citigroup/?postversion=2007021314 [http://perma.cc/9HYE-CDGQ]. Gramm had been
introducing variants ofthe GLBA since before 1995. After leaving government, Gramm went to work for
UBS AG. Lardner, supra note 24, at 3.
81. See Joe Mahon, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Commonly Called
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 12, 1999), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events
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GLBA aimed to allow U.S.-based banks to operate as universal banks. To do
this, the GLBA created the financial holding company (FHC), an evolution of
the BHC that allowed commercial and investment banks to be owned by the same
holding company.8 2 Cross-marketing restrictions prevented banks from
marketing the products and services of other entities within the holding
company. The GLBA also eliminated the commercial/investment bank
affiliation restrictions contained in Sections 20 and 32 of the GSA.84 A national
bank could now engage in financial activities through a subsidiary so long as the
financial subsidiary does not exceed the lesser of $50 billion or 45% of the bank's
assets. State member banks could control a subsidiary engaging in all the
activities allowed a subsidiary of a national bank. With FDIC approval, they
could also engage as principals in numerous activities not allowed to be
conducted by national banks.
Still, the GLBA did not eliminate Glass-Steagall completely. Sections 16
and 21 largely continued the restriction on activities carried on within
subsidiaries.87 National banks still could not engage in insurance underwriting,
merchant banking, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate
development, or real estate investment. Along with this internal divide, the
GLBA also attempted to account for at least some of the conflicts of interest that
could arise under this new structure. In addition, personal information of
consumers can only pass from banking subsidiaries (or be shared with third
parties) if the consumer is advised of the practice and has the option to opt out
of some sharing of personal information.89 However, these Glass-Steagall
remnants are almost wholly ineffective.
Despite the continued existence of conflicts of interests, the GLBA does
nothing to address them. In the absence of Glass-Steagall, it thus becomes critical
that this gap be addressed. Part II follows with a discussion of the conflicts of
interest presented by proprietary trading and the role of the Volcker Rule in
diminishing the conflicts.




84. Financial Services Modernization Act-Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Summary of
Provisions, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (2016), http://www.ffiec.gov/exam/InfoBase
/documents/02-con-g--bsummaryofprovisions-010416.pdf[http://perma.cc/57N3-KKTV].
85. Id.
86. Abdullah Al Mamun et al., The Impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on the
Financial Services Industry, 28 J. EcoN. & FIN. 333, 335 (2004).
87. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 38, at 16.
88. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 84.
89. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org
/privacy/glba/ [http://perma.cc/2MFP-FH7K]. GLBA's privacy clauses were also heavily influenced by a
wider trend of data security both in the United States and abroad. Id.
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II. Conflicts of Interests and Attempts to Address the Legislative Gap
This Part focuses on the problems that arise from conflicts of interest,
specifically in connection with proprietary trading. Examining these issues, and
various attempts at reform, coupled with the empirical data discussed in Part III,
highlights why the Volcker Rule must be vigorously enforced.
There have been a few attempts to address conflicts of interests inherent in
proprietary trading within banks. But as will be demonstrated empirically in Part
III below, these attempts have not been successful. One mechanism, denoted as
"Chinese Walls," has been defined as "a self-styled regulatory mechanism aimed
at stemming the flow of material information from one department in a
conglomerate to another and resolving the legal problems associated with
conflicts of interest and duty generally."90 Our empirical results demonstrate,
however, that proprietary trading still gives rise to conflicts of interest even if
Chinese Walls are effective in limiting access to information between
departments. The second mechanism, inherent in the Volcker Rule, is a much
more important mechanism given its potential to severely curtail conflicted
trades and, as argued below, needs to be enforced rather than eliminated.
A. The Conflict: Proprietary Trading
1. Different Viewpoints on Bank Conflicts of Interest and Proprietary
Trading
There are varying viewpoints in this context about the nature of the harm
presented by conflicts of interest inherent in proprietary trading. Some
commentators view proprietary trading and conflicts of interest as harmful on
multiple levels. For example, Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin blamed
unchecked conflicts of interest (deregulation of banking entities) and proprietary
trading for financial crashes during the Great Depression as well as in 2008,
noting that "poor policy choices and lax regulation led to unbridled proprietary
trading and unchecked conflicts of interest that helped create the conditions that
resulted in the crisis."9 1 This resulted in dire consequences, the senators noted,
because although "a massive economic collapse was prevented, the subsequent
recession was nonetheless extraordinarily severe, and the recovery has been
slow." 92
On the other hand, some scholars are more skeptical about attempts to
eradicate conflicts of interest in the banking sector, particularly when it comes
90. HARRY MCVEA, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES AND THE CHINESE WALL:
REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 8 (1993).
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to proprietary trading. Julius Loeser contends that while proprietary trading
happens, it is not a problem-for a couple of reasons.93 For one, he contends that
proprietary trading occurs on such a small scale that its effect is essentially null-
"[p]roprietary trading at traditional large banks, such as Wells Fargo
and Bank of America, accounts for less than one percent of total revenue."94 He
further claims that, instead of helping fix problems, attempting to limit
proprietary trading via the Volcker Rule "could hurt healthy diversification of
income streams of banking organizations and reduce capital flows to small and
medium-sized businesses, neither of which is a positive pro-safety and
soundness, financial growth-oriented economic outcome."95
Taking an approach more in the middle, Professor Manasfi worries that
banning all proprietary trading is the wrong course of action to take, claiming
that it brings some benefits.96 Rather than arguing that proprietary trading has no
negative effects, however, Professor Manasfi contends that "we must look at
some of the more nuanced causes of the financial crisis and not just throw the
baby, the potential benefits of deregulation, out with the bathwater, excessive
risk taking."97 Her argument focuses on systemic risk, and acknowledges that
conflicts of interest may raise different concerns: "[t]he most egregious conflict
of interest examples include designing products to fail, selling them to clients
and then making trading bets on the products' collapse."98 That said, she believes
that conflicts of interest can be addressed through some means other than the
Volcker Rule, such as through requiring more disclosures.9 9
2. Problems Associated with Proprietary Trading
When the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed in full after the passage of the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, previous restrictions on
proprietary trading ("allow[ing] commercial banking groups to invest
and trade in securities for their own accounts") were removed, enabling banks to
re-engage in this sort of behavior.10 0 In other words, a practice creating very
serious conflicts of interest was suddenly allowed.101 "Proprietary trading offers
93. Julius L. Loeser, The "Volcker Rule": Barring Banking Organizations from
Proprietary Trading, Fund Investment, and Sponsorship, 11 ENGAGE 45,48 (2010).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Julie A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk andDodd-Frank's VoIcker Rule, 4 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 181, 208 (2013).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 211.
99. Id. at 212.
100. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary
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financial firms with clients the additional temptation to magnify returns by taking
advantage of their knowledge of investment activities of their clients."
102
Furthermore, Senators Merkley and Levin noted:
Two notable ways in which banks put their proprietary trading interests ahead of
their clients were (1) the creation and marketing of products to clients that were
secretly designed to fail; and (2) the use of client trading information against the
interests of those clients and others in the markets.103
Ultimately, the problem comes down to the following. A bank is using
assets of the people it is supposed to be serving as clients for its own economic
gain.1 0 4 Furthermore, as Senator Merkley pointed out, what happened was not
just morally questionable-it had real implications for banks' clients:
The rise of securitization tempted firms to engage in an egregious form of self-
dealing: designing products to fail, selling them to unsuspecting clients, and
making proprietary trading bets on the products' collapse. This practice has been
analogized to a firm designing a car with faulty brakes and then purchasing a life
insurance policy on the driver.105
Essentially, banks loaded the dice so that they could profit from the short
side of a transaction, while leaving clients to deal with the long term as products
declined in value.106 Additionally, there could be more long-term harm to clients
when banks use clients' information against clients during their future trades.
10 7
Commentators have discussed the connection between the Volcker Rule's
prohibitions on proprietary trading and incentives for firms to use non-public
client information, and others have considered utilizing the Volcker Rule as a
means to reduce use of non-public client information. Professor Tuch contends
that "the rule's prohibition on proprietary trading will significantly reduce
opportunities and incentives for financial conglomerates to use non-public client
information in violation of information barriers, especially considering that
proprietary trading was a key driver of financial conglomerates' revenues."
08
Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin noted that many advocates of the Volcker
Rule, including themselves and other senators, saw potential in the rule's ability
to address concerns relating to conflicts of interest and proprietary trading.1 0 9
- 102. Id. at 522.
103. Id. at 523.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. (outlining what one bank did in proprietary trading and how this was
harmful to the bank's clients).
107. Id.
108. Andrew F. Tuch, Financial Conglomerates andInformation Barriers, 39 J. CORP.
L. 563, 567 (2014).
109. Merkley & Levin, supra note 100, at 531-37.
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Thus, while the idea that the Volcker Rule could be used to discourage trading
on proprietary, non-public information is certainly not new, this Article seeks to
provide important empirical support for this claim.
B. Chinese Walls
Chinese Walls have been applauded as being instrumental in preventing
conflicts of interest by separating confidential non-public information of banking
clients from that of traders.'10 One scholar contended that they are "analogous to
corporate codes of conduct and offer insight about how a code of conduct should
function and what legal standards should govern when the government or a
private party seeks to impose vicarious liability on a public company.""' In the
banking context, Chinese Walls are rarely, in practice, shown to be shields
against liability.112
Following the prosecution of a litany of insider trading cases,13 Congress
passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(ITSFEA).1 4 This Act set forth the following requirements:
Every registered broker or dealer shall establish, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature
of such broker's or dealer's business, to prevent the misuse in violation of this
chapter, or the rules or regulations thereunder, of material, nonpublic information
by such broker or dealer or any person associated with such broker or dealer.15
Section 204 of the Investment Advisers Act contains a similar requirement for
investment advisers."'6
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals of the early 2000s,
Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).1' Pursuant to SOX, Section
15D(a)(3) was added to the 1934 Act." 8 Relevant to our analysis, this section
requires that the SEC or self-regulatory organizations (SROs), uch as National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), promulgate rules to "establish
110. See, e.g., Harry McVea, Financial Conglomerates and Conflicts of Interest:
Resolving a Regulatory Dilemma, 47 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 239, 243-44 (1996) (describing Chinese Walls as
the "linchpin ofthe financial conglomerate regulatory system").
111. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1606 (1990).
112. Id. at 1624.
113. See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING & THE WALL §
9.03 (2017).
114. Pub. L. No. 100-704, codified in a number of provisions of the federal securities
laws.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 780(g) (2018). Note that this provision was originally Section 15(f) of
the Securities Exchange Act.
116. Id. § 80b-4a.
117. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78).
118. S. REP. No. 107-205 (2002).
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structural and institutional safeguards within registered brokers or dealers to
assure that securities analysts are separated by appropriate informational
partitions within the firm from the review, pressure or oversight of those whose
involvement in investment banking activities might potentially bias their
judgment or supervision."'19 The NASD and New York Securities Exchange
(NYSE) drafted rules that were approved by the SEC.
A Chinese Wall is not foolproof. Professor Tuch argued that it is difficult
to prove that a firm failed to maintain a Chinese Wall, or that it breached its
Wall.1 20 Furthermore, "[d]etection may be getting even harder as trading speeds
and volumes have increased."l2 1 One of us, Professor Seyhun, previously
remarked that "Chinese Walls are porous and ineffective, and material,
nonpublic information about the client firm is allowed to pass between
departments of the securities firms."' 22 Accordingly, Professor Seyhun argues
that firms should assume from the start that Chinese Walls are porous and that
additional safeguards need to be put in place.12 3 This follows from the work of
Carlos E. M6ndez-Peflate, who noted that high-ranking executives, in particular,
must be allowed to cross the firm's Chinese Walls to perform their corporate
duties.12 4 Furthermore, Martin Lipton and Robert Mazur have pointed out that
"[t]he difficulty of discovering misuse of inside information is, of course, the
greatest shortcoming of the Chinese Wall approach." 2 5
In addition, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove intentional misconduct
when an alternate explanation may be offered. As Tuch notes:
In particular, suspicious trading may be the result of benign rationales, including
coincidence or the superior trading skill or intellect of the traders involved, rather
than failing information barriers. Disproving these benign explanations can be
extraordinarily difficult, especially because direct evidence of information flows
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)(3); see also Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities
Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1077 (2003) ("In
addition, the Act mandates rulemaking to increase disclosure of analyst conflicts of interest, including the
extent of an analyst's investments in securities of a covered issuer; business relationships between
covered issuers and brokerage firms; compensation received from the issuer by the analyst or the
brokerage firm; and any other material conflicts."); S. J. Hilgers, Under the Influence: Analyzing Wall
Street Research Analyst Conflicts ofInterest and the Responses Designed To Induce Impartiality, 3 1 SEC.
REG. L.J. 427,451 (2003).
120. Tuch, supra note 108, at 589.
121. Id. at 589 (citing Insider Trading: Tipping the Scales, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21532280 [http://perma.cc/33AW-ULKB]).
122. Seyhun, supra note 13, at 371.
123. Id.at387.
124. See Carlos E. M6ndez-Peflate, The Bank "Chinese Wall": Resolving and
Contending with the Conflicts ofDuties, 93 BANKING L.J. 674, 685 (1976) (discussing potential problems
associated with maintaining Chinese Walls).
125. Martin Lipton & Robert B, Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict
Problems ofSecurities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459, 494 (1975).
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is seldom available, and regulators must therefore rely on circumstantial evidence
to prove wrongdoing.126
Furthermore, "[g]iven that the Wall is largely dependent upon self-
enforcement in an arena where self-interest is so prevalent it would seem
unrealistic to assume at all times and in all circumstances that the Wall will be
completely effective." 27
Professor Tuch has reviewed empirical studies suggesting that the notion
that Chinese Walls are effective in separating information flow within a firm is
misplaced.128 For example, he cites a study by Professor Bodnaruk and
colleagues that finds that the retail branches of investment banks often took
positions in firms that were targets of acquisitions after negotiations had started
-and the investment banking (advisory) branches of said banks were already
representing the targets in an advisory capacity during the targets' negotiations
with potential acquirers.129 Thus, the Bodnaruk study concludes that the
investment banks were likely trading on privileged, private information gathered
by the advisory branch in its retail operations.30 In addition, Professor Tuch
notes that Chinese Walls have not only been ineffective in preventing trades on
improperly leaked information, they have also failed to prevent firms from
bowing to conflicts of interest and violating the duties owed to clients,13 1
particularly in the mergers-and-acquisitions context.132
C. The Volcker Rule
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. enacted legislation
attempting to address the perceived problems of the financial industry, entitled
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the
126. Tuch, supra note 108, at 589 (citing Melissa Maleske, An Insider Falls, INSIDE
COUNSEL 28-29 (Aug. 2012); Chad Bray et al., Insider Case Lands Big Catch, WALL ST. J. (June 15,
2012, 7:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303822204577468470878668722
[http://perma.cc/4646-B42Z]).
127. McVEA, supra note 90, at 214; see also Norman S. Poser, Conflicts ofInterest
Within Securities Firms, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 114 (1990) [hereinafter Poser, Conflicts] (stating that
Chinese Walls are a "fake" (quoting Improper Activities in the Securities Industry: Hearings before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1987) (statement of
Sen. William Proxmire))).
128. Tuch, supra note 108, at 585-86. In addition, Tuch calculates "various trading
returns for a given financial conglomerate in a particular period and then compar[es] those returns" in his
discussion of failure of information barriers and the Volcker Rule's influence on those barriers.
129. Id. at 586 & n.118 (citing Andriy Bodnaruk et al., Investment Banks as Insiders
and the Market for Corporate Control, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 4989, 5020-24 (2009)).
130. Bodnaruk, supra note 129, at 5024.
131. Tuch, supra note 108, at 572-74.
132. See id. at 776 (discussing how firms may try to get around the problems here,
noting that "in their contracts with clients in various contexts, such as mergers and acquisitions and
securities underwriting, financial conglomerates routinely disclaim the existence of agency relationships
and fiduciary duties").
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"Dodd-Frank Act"). Sections 619 and 621 of the Act specifically limit
conflicted trades'3 4-and are collectively referred to as the Volcker Rule.13 5 The
stated purpose of the Rule is:
(1) to reduce risks to the financial system by limiting the ability of banks to engage
in activities other than socially valuable core banking activities;
(2) to protect taxpayers and reduce moral hazard by removing explicit and implicit
government guarantees for high-risk activities outside of the core business of
banking; and
(3) to eliminate any conflict of interest that arises from banks engaging in
activities from which their profits are earned at the expense of their customers or
clients.136
The Volcker Rule was implemented to promote financial stability in the
United States by "improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system . .. to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices."137 The Rule has historical
precedent in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. When Paul Volcker, former Federal
Reserve Chairman, proposed the Rule, his central idea was to shield the banking
system from non-banking capital market risks, and thus take control of volatility
of bank earnings and threats to financial stability.13 8
The Rule was intended to prohibit bank holding companies and subsidiaries
with access to the discount window at the Federal Reserve or to FDIC insurance
from engaging in high-risk activities such as proprietary trading, speculative
133. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C). For a
history of the Volcker Rule, see Julie A.D. Manasfi, Dodd-Frank's Volcker Rule Revisited: Do the
Potential Costs Outweigh the Purported Benefits?, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 12, 16 (May
2017).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2018).
135. See Ryan K. Brissette, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: The Volcker Rule's Unintended Consequences, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 231, 239-40
(2011) (identifying the above-mentioned sections as the "Volcker Rule").
136. 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2017, H.R. 2585, 115th Cong. (2017).
According to one commentator:
The Rule's primary purpose is to be a small piece of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), aimed at alleviating
the need to bail out large banking entities that pose systemic risk to the financial
health of the United States. It does so by limiting the amount of speculative, high-
risk investments at banking entities. Instead, it encourages banking entities to
focus on client activities that are generally lower-risk.
Brissette, supra note 135, at 237.
137. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619.
138. Jussi Keppo & Josef Korte, Risk Targeting and Policy Illusions-Evidence from
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hedge fund, and private equity investment. '3 The trading prohibition applies to
short-term trading. The prohibition comes with limited exceptions, allowing
proprietary trading pertinent to the following activities: underwriting, market-
making, risk-mitigating hedging, trading in domestic government debt, trading
on behalf of customers, and trading by insurance companies.140
All U.S.-organized banking entities, including their worldwide
subsidiaries, and all the U.S.-located subsidiaries of foreign-organized banking
entities are subject to the Rule.14 1 The Rule effectively prohibits U.S. banks and
foreign banks with U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading and
restricts their private equity activity. 42 In order to comply with these regulations,
banking entities subject to the Rule must expend significant resources to ensure
that they take actions in four important areas: compliance and reporting
standards; data gathering and reporting structures; compensation and
governance; and communication and culture.143 The deadline for banks to
comply with the Rule underwent several extensions, and the Rule came into
effect on July 21, 2015.144
The following sections cover the important provisions of the Volcker Rule
that aim to address conflicts of interest. Section 619 generally prohibits universal
banks from proprietary trading, thus inhibiting associated conflicts of interest,
except in a limited number of securities and situations including trading in
government obligations and market-making; however, even permitted activities
and transactions are subject to prohibition if they "would involve or result in a
material conflict of interest . .. between the banking entity and its clients. . .145
Section 621 essentially prevents banks from executing any transaction within
one year after the date of the first closing of the sale of an asset-backed security
that would involve a material conflict of interest with any investor.14 6
The ban attempts to remove the conflict of the crisis described above by
removing one of the principals in the transaction, the proprietary trading desk. In
139. Jack Bao, Maureen O'Hara & Alex Zhou, The Volcker Rule and Market-Making
in Times ofStress 29 (Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-102 Working Paper, 2016), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016102pap.pdf [http://perma.cc/HRH6-KTMH].
140. Vinita Tandon, The Volcker Rule: Clarifying the Anti-Evasion Provision to
Facilitate Compliance, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 385 (2016).
141. Volcker Rule, DAVIS POLK 3-4 (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-
frank/memoranda/volcker-rule [http://perma.cc/5W8Z-U6UQ].
142. Volcker Rule, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE Sys.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/volcker-rule.htm [http://perma.cc/9GMP-SYX5].
143. Steve Culp, Final Volcker Rule Leaves Banks Facing Compliance Hurdles,
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2013/12/17/final-volcker-rule-leaves-
banks-facing-compliance-hurdles [http://perma.cc/XND8-98ZX].
144. Daniel Roberts, Volcker Rule Takes Effect Today After Years of Delay, FORTUNE
(July 22,2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/volcker-rule [http://perma.cc/Y7F5-DSAY].
145. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2018).
146. Under Rule 127B, a material conflict of interest is found to be material under a
two-prong test.
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doing so, the bank no longer faces the threat of being divided between itself over
its customers-or in actuality, being loyal to itself over its customers. According
to one scholar, "[t]he Volcker Rule, in effect, was motivated by a desire to return
to a traditional banking model-to create a regulatory divide, much like the
Glass-Steagall Act before its repeal in 1999 . .. .',147 According to Senators
Merkley and Levin, it was necessary "(1) to separate federal support for the
banking system from speculative trading activity with the banking entity's own
capital; (2) to reduce potential conflicts of interest between a banking entity and
its customers; and (3) to reduce risk to banking entities and nonbanking financial
companies designated for supervision by the Federal Reserve Board."1 4 8
The former Federal Reserve Chairman said:
When the bank ... is trading for its own account, it will almost inevitably find
itself consciously or inadvertently, acting at cross purposes to the interests of an
unrelated commercial customer of a bank .... [E]ven with best efforts of board
and management, so-called Chinese Walls can [not] remain impermeable against
the pressures to seek maximum profit and personal remuneration.
149
Section 620 of the Act directs regulators to consider whether any other
banking activities should be restricted in order to protect the safety and
soundness of the financial system.o5 0 But Congress did allow for some
exceptions. If a statutorily permitted activity of Section 619 is found to pose a
material conflict of interest, the bank may continue with it if:
(1) the entity makes clear, timely and effective disclosure and in a manner that
that provides the client an opportunity to negate any adverse effect created by the
conflict; or
(2) the entity has information barriers that prevent the conflict of interest from
involving or resulting in a materially adverse effect on a client. However, an entity
cannot rely an information barrier if it knows or reasonably should have known
that even with the barrier, a materially adverse effect may result and in that case,
147. Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1
HARV. Bus. L. REV. 39,42-43,66 (2011); see also Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker
Rule and Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 365 (2012) (discussing both traditional and new
justifications for regulating conflicts of interest).
148. Am. Bankr. Inst., Legislative Highlights, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 82 (Aug. 30,
2011).
149. Paul Volcker's Prepared Testimony to Senate Bank Panel, REUTERS (Feb. 2,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-regulation-volcker-text/paul-volckers-prepared-
testimony-to-senate-bank-panel-idUSTRE6115WK20100202 [http://perma.cc/D43N-BX6G].
150. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 629, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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timely and effective disclosure of the conflict would be required to "cleanse" the
conflict.151
That said, the Volcker Rule has faced some criticism and opposition. It has
been critiqued for being over-simplified in its proscription. Banks will find
alternative routes to arbitrage the Rule and execute the same trades,15 2 and,
"[t]his new round of financial engineering ... may further increase the level of
unnecessary complexity in the financial markets and thus make effective
regulation even more difficult to achieve."5 3 Some critics have attempted to
show, with empirical data, that "the Volcker Rule has a deleterious effect on
corporate bond liquidity and dealers subject to the Rule become less willing to
provide liquidity during stress times.154
Foreign-organized banking entities have been especially critical of the Rule
because of its extraterritorial effects on foreign financial institutions. For
example, Erkii Liikanen, Chairman of the European Union's High Level Expert
Group on Banking Reform, criticized the Rule for being too narrow because it
targets almost exclusively proprietary trading and uses an approach much too
radical to address the problem.155 As of December 2013, fifteen German banks
were affected, including Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and UniCredit.'5 ' The
Rule imposes substantial compliance costs on both Deutsche Bank and
Commerzbank to satisfy its robust and complicated compliance measures.
In addition, the Rule imposes significant reporting and recordkeeping
requirements when bank entities engage in prohibited proprietary trading. In
order to meet the reporting requirement, he Rule compels bank entities to initiate
programs designed to prohibit future violations of the Rule; to ensure the
programs' operation, it requires periodic review by senior management and
certification from the CEO of the bank.157
151. Id.
152. "Banking activities may still be affected by proprietary trading- an end-run around
the Volcker Rules' divide- but now through the banks' reliance on risk out-sourcing to hedge funds and
the hedge fund industry." Whitehead, supra note 147, at 70. Letter from David Arkuch & Bartlett Naylor,
Pub. Citizen, to Secy. Tim Geithner et al. Re: Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests
in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, at 44 (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4 1-lIl/s74111-296.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 8UBT-KBPE].
153. Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 84, 93 (2011).
154. Bao et al., supra note 139, at 29.
155. Chair of E. U. Expert Group Calls Volcker Rule the Most Narrow and Radical
Approach, 7 HEDGE FUNDS & PRIV. EQUITY 3 (CCH).
156. Christine P. Henry, The Volcker Rule and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality: Utterly Incompatible, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 825, 834-35 (2016).
157. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 351.20 (2017) (listing specifications on reporting
requirements under the Volcker Rule).
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Despite these criticisms, however, we join in with other scholars who
advocate enforcement of the Volcker Rule.15' We provide new empirical
evidence in support of this proposition. The next Part details our empirical
evidence from which we conclude that the conflicted trades that the Volcker
Rule, particularly sections 619 and 621, is designed to proscribe are alive and
well. Based on our empirical study, we urge regulators to improve the
enforcement mechanisms of the Rule.
III. The Empirical Evidence of the Continuing Problem of Conflicts of Interest
In this Section, we empirically investigate the nature and profitability of
trading by banks and other insiders. Banks typically acquire insider trading status
on a temporary basis when they are hired as investment advisers."'9 As a result,
they become subject to insider trading reporting requirements and trading
restrictions.o60 We expect the temporary insider status to provide banks and other
investment advisers with valuable, material non-public information.161
Furthermore, we expect the temporary insiders to obtain and trade on adverse
information about their clients.6 2 Profitable trading by banks and other
investment advisers using adverse information about the clients can create
conflicts of interest because such trading will publicize the adverse information
prematurely, depress stock price of the client firms, and make it more difficult
for the client firms to solve their financial problems, which they hired the banks
and investment advisers to help solve in the first place.16 3 Under these conditions,
we expect that strict enforcement of the Volcker Rule would reduce these
systemic risks and potential conflicts of interest.
To test our hypothesis, we obtained stock price information from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The insider trading data comes from the
158. See supra notes 108-109; see also Rafael E. Gonzdlez Ramos, The Good, the Bad,
and the Volcker Rule?, 3 U.P.R. BUS. L.J. 124, 134 (2012) ("The Volcker Rule is a good approach to
protect the United States financial market and taxpayers, as well as international financial markets and
taxpayers"); Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies ofthe Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. REV. 469,
533 (2013) ("An expressive implementation of the Rule's market making exemption not only will help to
differentiate the prospective roles of bank-affiliated dealers, nonbank financial companies, and end-users
of financial instruments ... but also may improve the long-term vitality and competitiveness of financial
markets"); Douglas M. Branson, A Return to Old-Time Religion? The Glass-Steagall Act, the Volcker
Rule, Limits on Proprietary Trading, and Sustainability, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 359, 381 (2014)
(expressing concern that the Volcker Rule does not go far enough).
159. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (discussing the concept of temporary
insider).
160. See 12 C.F.R. § 351.20 (for information on reporting requirements under the
Volcker rule).
161. See Section II(C) (highlighting certain aspects of the Volcker rule).
162. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 6 (discussing an example of accumulation of
adverse information).
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union of the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (1996 to 2016) and
backward extensions using archived annual purchases from the National
Archives (1975 to 1995) (collectively, "Insider Trading Database"). Our sample
includes U.S. common stocks (CRSP share codes of 10 or 11) that are covered
by all three databases. The time period is from January 1975 through December
2016. We restrict attention to this interval due to the availability of insider
trading data, which first became available in January 1975. We include
observations beginning only from the time when the firms first appear in the
combined Insider Trading Database. We adjust stock returns for delisting using
the CRSP delisting file.164 Our final dataset has over 20,000 unique CUSIPs and
over 3,500,000 observations.
The combined Insider Trading Database includes all trades reported to the
SEC-Ownership Reporting System. The data contains all open market purchases
and sales by officers and directors, executives, and investment advisers of
publicly traded firms. Top executives are limited to officer and director (OD),
officer, director, and beneficial owner (H), chairman of the board (CB), CEO,
CFO, controlling person (CP), general partner (GP), and president (P).
Investment bankers are coded with "IA." Officers are defined as all other
officers. Large shareholders with an officer title are included in the sample.
Outside large shareholders (SH) and outside beneficial owner of more than 10%
of a class security (B) are excluded.
Shares acquired through the exercise of options, stock awards, and trades
with corporations are excluded. The final sample is limited to firms for which
stock return data are available in CRSP. Finally, in order to deal with potential
misreports and incorrect outliers, three filters are used. On the insider transaction
date, (1) the insider transaction price must be less than twice the closing price of
the stock, (2) the number of shares of the insider transactions will be less than
the daily volume of trade of the stock, and (3) the number of shares of the insider
transaction will be less than the outstanding number of shares for the stock.16 5
We measure the profitability of insider trades starting from the insider trade
date. We measure abnormal stock return behavior using the cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal daily stock returns (CAR) starting from the trade date (date
0) for a period of T days:
T
CARi,T =1 Hi,, (r,, - r..,),
t=0
where Hu, takes the value I for insider purchases and -1 for insider sales. Thus,
we define an insider purchase to be abnormally profitable if the stock price
outperforms the general stock market after the purchase. Similarly, we define an
164. We follow the procedure used in Tyler Shumway, The Delisting Bias in CRSP
Data, 52 J. FIN. 327 (1997).
165. Qualitative results do not change if these filters are not enforced. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
369
Yale Journal on Regulation
insider sale to be abnormally profitable if the stock price underperforms the
general stock market after the sale. The variable rit is the with-dividend return
to stock i for day t, and rm,, is the with-dividend return to the CRSP equally-
weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange,
and NASDAQ stocks for day t. We examine the profitability of insider trades for
T=10, 20, 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250 days following insiders' transactions.
To focus on insider transactions that are likely to be based on material, non-
public information, we first require that the abnormal profitability (CAR) of
insiders' transactions exceed 5% by day 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250.
Summary statistics of the data for the period 1975-2016 are shown in Table 1.
This table provides summary statistics of insider trades by officers, top
executives, and investment bankers. Panel A provides number of trades, average
number of shares purchased, and average number of shares sold by officers,
executives and investment advisers in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The pre-
SOX period includes the time frame of January 1, 1975 to August 31, 2002 and
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Insider Trades for the 1975-2016 Period
Panel A: Number of Insiders' Trades
Number of Number of Number of Total
Purchases Sales Transactions
Pre-SOX
Officers 462,394 707,381 1,169,775
Executives 160,882 285,133 446,015
Investment
Bankers 323 283 606
Post-SOX
Officers 197,923 1,102,325 1,300,248
Executives 104,512 744,529 849,041
Investment
Bankers 628 336 964
Total 926,662 2,839,987 3,766,649
Panel B: Insiders' Trades by Insider Relationship
Average Average Total Shares
Number of Number of Purchased- SoldShares
Phaese Shares Sold (Millions)Purchased
Pre-SOX
Officers 3,694.66 8,790.65 4,321.92 - 10,283.08
Top Executives 3,913.58 13,039.08 1,745.52 - 5,815.63
Investment Bankers 6,096.60 6,355.66 3.69 - 3.85
Post-SOX
Officers 4,179.65 12,764.91 5,434.58 - 16,597.55
Top Executives 1,904.37 8,052.33 1,616.89 - 6,836.76
Investment Bankers 1,908.28 13,277.45 1.84- 12.80
Total 13,124.44 - 39,549.67
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Table 1 further displays the number of trades, average number of shares
purchased, and average number of shares sold by relationship. This table
provides information about insider trades for all three insider groups. We also
separate the analysis period as pre-SOX and post-SOX. The pre-SOX period
includes the time frame of January 1, 1975 to August 31, 2002 and the post-SOX
period includes the time frame of September 1, 2002 to December 31, 2016. The
number of trades in the post-SOX era is somewhat higher than the number of
trades in the pre-SOX era for all three groups of insiders, even though the pre-
SOX period contains more than 27 years of data while the post-SOX period
contains about 13 years of data.
Our database is quite large, containing about 3.7 million insider trades from
1975 to 2016. The total number of shares sold is about 40 billion while the total
number of shares purchased is about 13 billion over this time period. Insiders on
average tend to sell more shares than they purchase because they receive a
significant number of shares as part of executive compensation.
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the average abnormal market-adjusted returns
(CAR) of insider trades in 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250-day horizons. The
market-adjusted abnormal return for each trade is computed as,
T
CARi, = Hi,, (r,, - r.,)
t=O
where ri, t is the with- dividend return to stock i on day t and rm, t is the with-
dividend return to an equally weighted portfolio of all New York Stock
Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks on day t. The
parameter H is equal to one if the insider trade is a purchase and negative one if
it is a sale. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Estimates that are statistically
significant at the 5% level or better are in bold.
. Table 2 displays insiders' abnormal profits for the overall sample period
for officers, top executives, investment advisers, and also for all insiders. Our
database contains approximately 2.5 million transactions by officers and 1.3
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As shown in Table 2, the abnormal market adjusted returns of all officers
and top executives are positive and statistically significant for all analysis
horizons. The evidence shows that all three groups of insiders, as well as the
overall sample of all insiders engaged in profitable trading. Abnormal returns for
officers' trades rise to more than 4%, while the abnormal returns of top
executives rise to more than 5% for the one-year holding period (250 trading
days). For shorter holding periods, abnormal returns remain at or below one
percent for the first 20 trading days (about one calendar month).
The abnormal profits of investment advisers are also positive and larger,
rising to about 6% by day 20. Moreover, these abnormal profits attain statistical
significance even for short-term horizons (up to 20 days). A longer horizon
analysis provides larger positive abnormal returns for the investment bankers
(about 11%), but not significantly different from zero due to the smaller sample
size.
Typically, insiders tend to trade on long-lived informationl6 6 in order to
avoid legal liability. Our evidence in Table 2 is consistent with this observation
for officers and top executives. However, the large and immediate profitability
of trading by investment banks by day ten goes against this observation. This
finding suggests that the investment bankers may be less concerned about legal
liability and they tend to trade on short-lived information as well.
One concern in Table 2 might be that we independently examine insiders'
abnormal profits over many different horizons and some of these results that are
significant at the 5% level might be due to random chance. To address this
concern, we ran multiple regressions separately for officers, top executives, and
investment advisers by including independent variables for non-overlapping
horizons (1,10 days), (11,20 days), (21,50) days, (51,100 days), (101,150 days),
(151,200 days), and (201,250 days). For both officers and top executives, each
and every one of these non-overlapping horizons showed marginally statistically
significant abnormal profits. For investment advisers, only the first 10-day
investment horizon showed marginally statistically significant abnormal profits.
Based on these findings, we conclude that our overall conclusions are not
affected by an overlapping horizon issue.
373
166. Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making from
Crowded Floors to High-Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651,678 (2016).
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We next examine the volume of trading. If insiders understand the
implications of private information and do not worry about the legal
consequences of their trading, we would expect them to trade greater numbers
of shares when they have more valuable information. Our evidence is shown in
Table 3, which displays insiders' abnormal profits for the overall period grouped
by small and large volumes of trades. We define small trading volume as less
than or equal to 10,000 shares; and large trading volume as more than 10,000
shares.
Our evidence is consistent with the inference that insiders understand the
value of their information and they are not overly concerned about legal
consequences of their trading. For officers, abnormal profits rise from 3.7% to
6.8% when insiders trade less than 10,000 shares to more than 10,000 shares. For
top executives, abnormal profits rise from 4.5% to 7.9% for the two groups.
However, the most dramatic effect of trading volume can be observed from the
trades of investment bankers. When the investment banks trade small volumes,
abnormal returns after one year equals about 9%, which does not attain statistical
significance. For larger volumes of more than 10,000 shares, banks' abnormal
return rise to a whopping 25.4%, and they are statistically significant at the 1%
level.
Table 3 shows another interesting pattern for investment banks. When they
trade smaller volumes, their abnormal returns attain statistical significance in ten
days. When they trade larger volumes, their abnormal returns attain statistical
significance only around 50 days and remains statistically significant for a one-
year holding period. This finding is consistent with the inference that investment
bankers are not too concerned about the legal consequences of small volumes of
trading but they may be more concerned about large volumes of trading.167 As a
result, they may use large volumes of trading only to exploit long-lived
information.
376
167. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH.
L. REv. 313, 398 (2002) (acknowledging the greater palatability of small volume trading).
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Next, we investigate profitability of sales and purchases separately. To
focus more narrowly on information events, we also restrict our sample to large
volumes of trading only. Our evidence is shown in Table 4.
For both officers and top executives, both sales and purchases display
abnormal profitability. For officers, abnormal profitability equals about 6.6%
and 7.6%, for sales and purchases, respectively. For top executives, abnormal
profitability equals about 7.1% and 12.2%, for sales and purchases, respectively.
Hence, for both officers and top executives, purchases tend to be somewhat more
profitable than sales.
For investment bankers, this pattern is reversed. When they sell a large
volume of shares, abnormal profitability rises to 36.4%, which is very large and
highly significant. When investment bankers buy a large volume of shares,
abnormal profitability rises only to 2.7%, which is not significant. Thus, our
evidence indicates that investment bankers tend to trade and profit more on
adverse, material, non-public information. This finding suggests that the bankers
may be hired to help with some developing problems with the client firms. As a
result of this, they learn about the developing problems and the data suggests
they trade on this information.
If investment bankers trade on material, non-public adverse information
about their client firms, the banks may help disseminate this adverse material
information more publicly and lead to further negative consequences for their
clients. This kind of proprietary trading can be detrimental to the bankers' client
firms. Thus, it becomes important to enforce the Volcker Rule to prohibit this
kind of proprietary trading. The Volcker Rule can help reduce the conflicts of
interest between the banks and their client firms.
Finally, we investigate whether the profitability of proprietary trading by
the bankers has changed over time. For this purpose, we focus on the post-SOX
period (2002 to 2016) only. These results are shown in Table 5.
Our evidence shows that if anything, the abnormal profitability of the
proprietary trading by the banks has increased during the most recent period. The
one-year abnormal profits during the 2002 to 2016 period exceed 40% for large
sales by the banks. This amount is both large and statistically significant at the
1% level. This evidence is consistent with the inference that there is no decline
in the profitability of trading by investment advisers over time, indicating that
the concerns about proprietary trading continues to this day.
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Conclusion
In this Article we investigate whether the Volcker Rule has the potential to
reduce or eliminate the potential conflicts of interest between the banks and their
client firms. In general, the type of information banks use to trade is confidential.
Consequently, it is not possible to test the potential contribution of the Volcker
Rule.
We overcome these difficulties by exploiting a unique data set that contains
banks' proprietary trades when they attain temporary insider status in their client
firms. Banks attain insider trading status and become subject to insider trading
reporting requirements and trading restrictions when they are hired to provide
financial advice to their clients. They report these trades on Forms 3, 4, and 5,
alongside other insiders. Using empirical data reported by the banks themselves,
we demonstrate that banks can and do access important, private, material
information about their clients and the data suggests they trade on this
information. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that banks and other
investment advisers typically trade on and make profits from adverse
information about their clients. Hence, our evidence is designed to uncover the
importance of the private information banks acquire as part of their intermediary
and advisory role.
On average, we find that the inside information that banks acquire and trade
on is highly valuable, allowing the banks and investment advisors to earn more
than 25% on their proprietary trades. Furthermore, we find that relaxation and
elimination of the Glass-Steagall restrictions allowed the banks and investment
advisors to trade more frequently and earn greater amounts of abnormal profits.
Since 2002, banks and investment advisors tend to trade and earn more than 40%
abnormal profits from adverse information about their client firms. The nature
of the information that the banks and investment advisors trade on is adverse
(negative) information about their client firms. Hence, our empirical evidence
demonstrates that banks profit using adverse information about heir client firms,
exactly as envisioned by the Volcker Rule. Trading on adverse information about
their client firms suggests that banks and investment advisers do not worry about
potential conflicts of interests. By trading on adverse information, the banks and
investment advisers publicize their clients' financial problems, prematurely
depress their stock prices, and potentially make it more difficult for the client
firms to solve their financial problems. All these considerations are consistent
with potential conflicts of interest between the banks and other investment
advisers and their client firms.
Consequently, we provide important empirical support for.the idea that an
added benefit of implementation of the Volcker Rule would be to eliminate the
incentives to trade on material, non-public information about their clients that
benefit the banks to the detriment of their clients, by eliminating proprietary
trading by banks. Thus, we argue that implementing the Volcker Rule would also
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help contain some the current conflicts of interest present in the banking system
introduced by the elimination of Glass-Steagall restrictions.
In spite of these benefits, the future of the Volcker Rule is currently
uncertain. Recent legislation introduced by the Trump administration is directed
at repealing Dodd-Frank and eliminating the Volcker Rule altogether, instead of
implementing it. The Financial CHOICE Act, passed in the House in June 2017,
includes a repeal of the Volcker Rule in its effort to "[c]reat[e] [h]ope and
[o]pportunity for [i]nvestors, [c]onsumers and [e]ntrepreneurs."l68 House
Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling claimed the repeal
would pave way for "economic growth for all; bank bailouts for none."'6 9 Yet
our evidence indicates that instead of repealing, implementing the Volcker Rule
expeditiously would have the added benefit of reducing conflicts of interest.
Based on our evidence, we recommend strong enforcement of the Volcker Rule.
168. The Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 10, 110th Cong. (2017); The Financial Choice
Act Executive Summary, HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERV., http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/financial choice act executivesummary final.pdf [http://perma.cc/TD5E-XBVY].
169. Geoff Bennett, House Passed Bill Aimed at Reversing Dodd-Frank Financial
Regulations, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 8, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/06/08/532036374/house-
passes-bill-aimed-at-reversing-dodd-frank-financial-regulations [http://perma.cc/ YEC9-MLB7].
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